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framing on judgments of biological and
psychological bases of behavior
Nancy S. Kim1*, Samuel G. B. Johnson2, Woo-kyoung Ahn2 and Joshua Knobe3Abstract
Human behavior is frequently described both in abstract, general terms and in concrete, specific terms. We asked
whether these two ways of framing equivalent behaviors shift the inferences people make about the biological and
psychological bases of those behaviors. In five experiments, we manipulated whether behaviors are presented concretely
(i.e. with reference to a specific person, instantiated in the particular context of that person’s life) or abstractly (i.e. with
reference to a category of people or behaviors across generalized contexts). People judged concretely framed behaviors
to be less biologically based and, on some dimensions, more psychologically based than the same behaviors framed in
the abstract. These findings held true for both mental disorders (Experiments 1 and 2) and everyday behaviors
(Experiments 4 and 5), and yielded downstream consequences for the perceived efficacy of disorder treatments
(Experiment 3). Implications for science educators, students of science, and members of the lay public are discussed.
Keywords: Person perception, Causal attribution, Explanation, Framing effect, Science educationSignificance
In everyday life, we tend to frame behaviors in different
ways. Sometimes we talk about behavior in general terms
(e.g. some people stay calm in competitive situations; some
people lose pleasure in activities that they once enjoyed). At
other times, we talk about those same behaviors with
reference to particular people in the context of their lives
(e.g. Allen stayed calm during his figure-skating competi-
tion; Dan no longer takes pleasures in long country drives).
The question is whether these different kinds of descrip-
tions matter; that is, does framing affect the inferences we
make about those behaviors? Although these abstract and
concrete descriptions seem to essentially depict the same
behaviors, we found that the two levels of description lead
to different judgments about how to explain the behavior.
Across five studies, participants favored biological explana-
tions (e.g. brain chemistry; genetics) more for abstract de-
scriptions than for concrete cases and they favored some
psychological explanations (e.g. intentions; emotions) more
for concrete cases than for abstract descriptions. These* Correspondence: n.kim@northeastern.edu
1Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, 125 Nightingale Hall,
360 Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, USA
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reproduction in any medium, provided you giv
the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifshifts in people’s preferences occurred both for ordinary
behaviors (e.g. Allen’s calm behavior) and mental disorder
symptoms (e.g. delusions). As neuroscience and genetics
research have increasingly been capturing the public’s at-
tention, we argue that these results have important im-
plications for science education and for public health
communication.Background
In the real world, unusual human behaviors (e.g. the
symptoms of schizophrenia) are often described at one
of two distinct levels of abstraction. At one level, behav-
iors are described in the abstract, as generalized across
individuals. For example, when we google the word
“schizophrenia,” the websites that immediately come
up—from the National Institute of Mental Health, Men-
tal Health America, National Alliance for the Mentally
Ill, Wikipedia, schizophrenia.com, and so on—provide
abstract descriptions of schizophrenia and its symptoms
(e.g. delusions). Abstract descriptions are also found
when we search through an encyclopedia, dictionary, or
medical handbook. At another level, we also talk about
specific instances of the same behaviors (e.g. a woman
who strongly believes that the next-door neighbor is heris distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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learn about the concrete symptoms of schizophrenia via
the depiction of a particular person in a film (e.g. A
Beautiful Mind; Howard, 2001), book (e.g. I Know This
Much Is True; Lamb, 2008), or magazine article about an
individual. One might also learn by observing such
symptoms first-hand in a friend or family member, or
hear about other specific cases by word of mouth.
Our central question is whether there is any effect of
the level of abstraction at which the behaviors are de-
scribed. Previous studies showed that concrete examples
affect judgments more strongly than abstract descrip-
tions do, because concrete examples are more salient,
memorable, or convincing (e.g. Borgida & Nisbett, 1977;
Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; see also Semin & Fiedler,
1991 for different ways of construing abstract versus
concrete descriptions). In the current work, we ask
whether learning about behaviors in the abstract versus
from a concrete instance significantly shifts the kinds of
inferences laypeople then draw about the behavior. In
particular, we approach this question in terms of two dif-
ferent types of explanations for behaviors that are perva-
sive in lay discourse (as well as scientific): psychological
and biological explanations.
People often see human behaviors being explained in
terms of psychological constructs. For instance, one might
explain that a person has been feeling depressed because
she is under too much unrelenting stress at work. More
recently, as the field of neuroscience has rapidly pro-
gressed, people have also become familiar with biological
explanations for behaviors (O’Connor & Joffe, 2013). For
example, one could also explain that a person has been
feeling depressed due to a neurochemical imbalance. As
we will see in the next section, there are multiple possible
ways in which the level of abstraction at which behaviors
are depicted (i.e. abstractly or concretely) affects which
types of explanations (i.e. psychological and biological)
laypeople believe to be more plausible.
Relations between abstract versus concrete framing and
biological versus psychological explanations
We hypothesize that laypeople are relatively accepting of
biological explanations of behaviors in the abstract, but
are more reluctant to accept such explanations for the
behavior of concrete individuals. For instance, when con-
templating generalized anxiety disorder, laypeople may be
generally accepting of neurological or genetic exp-
lanations. Yet, when confronted with a particular concrete
individual with generalized anxiety disorder displaying
specific anxiety symptoms, people may be less inclined
to endorse biological explanations and instead explain
that individual’s symptoms as intentional or controllable.
Such findings could have considerable implications for
public health, given that judgments of intentionality orcontrollability are critical in driving stigma towards abnor-
mal behaviors and the stigmatizing attitudes of others
have enormous impact on treatment seeking, treatment
avoidance, and benefits from treatment (e.g. Pescosolido,
Martin, Lang, & Olafsdottir, 2008).
A recent study found empirical support for a similar hy-
pothesis in practicing mental health clinicians’ inferences
about biological and psychological bases of symptoms of
mental disorders (Kim, Ahn, Johnson, & Knobe, 2016).
We found that hallmark symptoms of disorders described
in the abstract led expert clinicians to endorse their bio-
logical basis more strongly, and their psychological basis
less strongly, than when the same symptoms were de-
scribed concretely (i.e. in terms of individual cases). For
instance, clinicians judged a disorder “characterized by
loss of pleasure” involving “feeling a substantially dimin-
ished interest in most activities, including activities found
enjoyable in the past” to be more biologically caused than
Dan’s problems of no longer showing “interest in most ac-
tivities, no longer taking pleasure in golfing or long coun-
try drives, even though these used to be some of his very
favorite weekend activities.” In addition, clinicians were
more likely to endorse the effectiveness of medication
when they received the abstract description than when
they received the concrete description, even though a pre-
test verified that the two descriptions were judged to be
essentially equivalent.
However, it is unclear whether these findings are
generalizable outside the population of clinicians and
the domain of mental health. It is possible that clinicians
are a special case, because in their intensive initial train-
ing and continuing education, clinicians generally learn
biological explanations for behavior in abstract form.
Much like laypeople, clinicians frequently encounter psy-
chological explanations in their ordinary concrete inter-
actions, and in their training, clinicians are exposed to
psychological evaluations of individual case studies in
clinical practice and through client case formulations
(Eells, Kendjelic, & Lucas, 1998). Importantly, however,
clinicians are also exposed throughout their training to
biological explanations through more abstract discussions
in textbooks and research articles (e.g. describing new
evidence for the neurochemical bases of schizophrenia).
By contrast, laypeople have a great deal of concrete experi-
ence with psychological explanation, but compared to
clinicians, they typically have far less exposure to abstract
discussions of biological explanation. One might therefore
predict that laypeople would not show the effect observed
among trained clinicians.
One might even further argue that because psycho-
logical states (e.g. intentions, stress) are not tangible in
nature, laypeople may actually see them as being more
abstract than biological states, which refer to tangible
things such as the physical brain. Furthermore, from a
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considered lower level explanations for behaviors than
psychological explanations for the same behaviors.
Within the hierarchy of levels of explanation, psycho-
logical explanations are more abstract than biological
ones, being relatively lacking in concrete, physically
grounded detail (e.g. Dennett, 1971). As a result, lay-
people might find abstractly framed stimuli to be more
compatible with psychological construals of behaviors
than with biological construals.
Still, there are some potential reasons to expect that
the framing effects previously obtained with practicing
clinicians may turn out to reflect a broader, more gen-
eral phenomenon. First, in linguistics, a distinction is
made between generic statements (i.e. generalizations
that are made about entire categories of people or
things, such as “girls wear pink”) and non-generic state-
ments (i.e. statements that are not generic, such as de-
scriptions of specific individuals like “Mary wears pink;”
see Cimpian & Erickson, 2012). Studies suggest that lay-
people prefer to explain generics in terms of inherent
features (e.g. pink is delicate and girls are hardwired to
be attracted to it) rather than external features (e.g. it is
merely a societal convention for girls to wear pink;
Cimpian & Salomon, 2014). In addition, biological proper-
ties are perceived to be more permanent, immutable, and
timeless than psychological properties (e.g. Dar-Nimrod &
Heine, 2011; Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004). For in-
stance, the more that people with depression attribute
their symptoms to biological factors such as brain abnor-
malities or genes, the more pessimistic they are about
recovery (Lebowitz, Ahn, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013).
Taken together, findings such as these suggest that bio-
logical explanations may seem more compatible with ab-
stract framing, which describes timeless patterns, than
with concrete framing, which describes transient events.
Second, psychological explanations may be more salient
to laypeople when a behavior is described concretely
than when it is described in the abstract. This idea is
supported by past work on people’s intuitions about free
will. When laypeople are told in the abstract about a
universe in which everything is fully determined, they
tend to say that no agent in this universe can be morally
responsible for his or her behavior, but when people are
told about one specific agent in the same deterministic
universe, they tend to say that this specific agent actu-
ally is morally responsible (Nichols & Knobe, 2007).
This effect arises because people reading a concrete case
are more inclined than are people reading about an ab-
stract case to think that the agent’s behavior was best
explained by his or her psychological states (Murray &
Nahmias, 2014). Thus, concrete descriptions of individ-
ual agents performing specific actions may make psycho-
logical states (e.g. intentions, feelings) salient in a way thatmore abstract descriptions do not (Nichols & Knobe,
2007; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008).
Overview of experiments
The main goal of the current experiments was to exam-
ine whether laypeople’s biological (and psychological)
judgments are affected by the abstract versus concrete
framing of behaviors and, if so, in what direction judg-
ments are affected. We tested these hypotheses by meas-
uring people’s endorsements of various biological and
psychological explanations for behavior, across a range
of equivalent abstract and concrete cases.
There are many ways to manipulate the abstractness
of behavior descriptions and many ways to determine
which levels of abstractness should be of primary inter-
est. We modeled our experimental manipulations on a
distinction frequently encountered in the real world.
The abstract version simulates general descriptions of
behaviors; that is, these descriptions make reference to
people exhibiting the behavior in general and describes
behaviors in the abstract (e.g. coming up with strange
beliefs that are contrary to fact and that persist strongly
despite having no evidence to support them), as in no-
sologies such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5, 5th ed., American Psychi-
atric Association, 2013). The concrete version makes ref-
erence to a particular person and describes behaviors as
specifically instantiated in the context of that person’s
life (e.g. Jenny has developed the strong belief that the
man living next door is her husband), as in casebook
training manuals for learning nosologies such as DSM-5
Clinical Cases (Barnhill, 2013). This way of manipulating
abstractness is the same as that deployed in Kim et al.’s
(2016) study with clinicians, allowing us to compare the
current results (Studies 1, 2, and 3) with those from
experts in the domain. Unlike in Kim et al.’s (2016)
study, however, we also used stimuli that are not symp-
toms of mental disorders because of the current focus
on laypeople rather than clinicians (Studies 4 and 5). For
example, participants in our studies might read about ei-
ther how some people stay calm during competitive situ-
ations (abstract description described generally) or how
Allen stayed calm during a figure-skating competition
(concrete, individual case described within the specific
context of that person’s life).
Our prediction is that biological explanations are
more strongly endorsed in the abstract than in the
concrete, and that psychological explanations of be-
havior are more strongly endorsed in concrete cases
than in the abstract. That is, we would expect lay-
people to think that brain chemistry, neural structure,
and so on are better explanations of calm perform-
ance in general than of Allen’s calm performance in
particular. Conversely, we predict that explanations
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tions would be endorsed more for Allen’s calm per-
formance than for calm performance in general.
We tested these predictions across five experiments.
Experiments 1 and 2 compared laypeople’s judgments of
the biological (and psychological) bases of various men-
tal disorders. Each disorder was described in a con-
cretely or abstractly framed vignette, judged by pretest
participants to be essentially equivalent. Experiment 3
tested whether these inferences have downstream conse-
quences for how people would choose to intervene on
disordered behavior—by using medication or by using
psychotherapy. Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 extended
these results beyond the domain of mental disorders,
examining lay judgments for behaviors that are uncom-
mon (and hence in need of explanation) but not the re-
sult of mental disorders.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tested whether laypeople’s causal attribu-
tions for disordered behavior are shifted by abstract versus
concrete framing. Although clinicians tend to view behav-
iors as more biologically based in the abstract than in the
concrete, and more psychologically based in the concrete
than in the abstract (Kim et al., 2016), it is unclear
whether this effect is largely induced by clinical training
and practice, or whether it would also extend to laypeople.
This question has considerable practical import, be-
cause laypeople’s attributions for mental disorders influ-
ence many outcomes of real-world importance. More
biological attributions for disordered behavior reduce
judgments of blame for symptoms (e.g. Corrigan &
Watson, 2004), but can increase essentialism (Haslam &
Ernst, 2002), leading to greater pessimism about recov-
ery (e.g. Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Lebowitz et al.,
2013). Furthermore, biological attributions for symptoms
are associated with the belief that medication is a more
effective treatment than psychotherapy (e.g. Iselin &
Addis, 2003; Luk & Bond, 1992; Yopchick & Kim, 2009).
The potential for abstract versus concrete framing to
affect such construals is a pressing issue in need of
examination, given that people frequently encounter
both abstract descriptions of disorder symptoms (e.g. on
WebMD) and concrete cases (e.g. their loved ones who
have disorder symptoms).
In addition, we probed the boundaries of this framing ef-
fect by asking participants about various types of biological
and psychological attributions. In previous work (Kim et al.,
2016), clinicians were asked to what extent the behaviors
are “biologically based” or “psychologically based” in gen-
eral, rather than about specific types of biological and psy-
chological causes. Yet, there are many different kinds of
both biological explanations (e.g. brain structure, genetics)
and psychological explanations (e.g. in terms of cognition,emotion, or intentions). To what extent would shifts in at-
tributions generalize across these types of biological and
psychological causation? We tested these questions in Ex-
periment 1 by asking participants to make judgments about
several different types of biological and psychological caus-
ation for disordered behavior.
Method
Participants
Fifty-one participants were recruited via Amazon Mech-
anical Turk (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).
Eight were excluded from analysis (N = 3 due to taking
similar studies in the past and N = 5 due to random re-
sponses on filler items).
Materials and pretest
We selected six items, each a hallmark symptom of a
well-known disorder in the DSM-IV-TR (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000).1 For each item, we wrote
an abstract version approximating the level of description
in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association,
2000), and a corresponding concrete version detailing be-
haviors exhibited by a specific person (approximating the
level of description in the DSM-IV-TR Casebook; Spitzer,
Gibbon, Skodol, Williams, & First, 2002). The two
versions were roughly equated for length (see Table 1).
Because we are testing the effect of abstract versus
concrete framing of the same behavior, we recruited a
separate group of 40 participants from Amazon Mech-
anical Turk to complete a pretest, measuring whether
the abstract and concrete version of each behavior cor-
respond to each other. Each behavior was shown on a
separate page and the two versions of each behavior, ab-
stract and concrete, were presented side by side on the
page. As an attention check, two filler items not de-
signed to be equivalent were also included. Four partici-
pants failed this check. Of the remaining 36 pretest
participants, 15 judged whether the abstract version was
“a good abstract description” of the concrete version on
a scale of 1–9 (where 1 = a very poor description; 9 = a
very good description), while 21 judged whether the
concrete version was “a good example” of the abstract
version on a scale of 1–9 (where 1 = a very poor ex-
ample; 9 = a very good example). The mean rating for
the “good abstract description” question was 7.97 (SD =
0.30); the mean rating for the “good example” question
was 8.21 (SD = 0.29). Mean ratings by item were all at
least 7.60. Thus, these pretest results verified that each
pair of abstract and concrete versions is fairly equivalent.
For the main experiment, we added abstract and concrete
versions of two filler items (i.e. having an unusually large
brain size; having a brain tumor) to allow for attention and
comprehension checks. If participants paid attention to the
task, these filler items should receive very high ratings on
Table 1 Stimuli for Experiments 1–3
Item Text version
Concrete Abstract
1. Delusional thoughts and
behaviors
Jenny has developed the strong belief that the man
living next door is her husband; she sometimes follows
him when he is driving and she sends hate mail to his
actual wife, though she has never actually met either of
them in person.
This disorder is characterized by delusional thoughts and
behaviors; it involves coming up with strange beliefs that
are contrary to fact and that persist strongly, influencing
daily behaviors, despite having no evidence to support
them.
2. Manic beliefs and behaviors Eric effusively talks about his dozens of highly unrealistic
business ideas, which he thinks are guaranteed to make
him millions of dollars; he erroneously believes that he is
irresistibly attractive to much younger women and is
oblivious to their rejections.
This disorder is characterized by manic beliefs and
behaviors; it involves holding extremely positive self-
views, which are often completely unfounded in reality,
and often talking excitedly about all of these beliefs,
despite the fact that they are untrue.
3. Loss of pleasure Dan no longer shows interest in most activities, no
longer taking pleasure in golfing or long country drives,
even though these used to be some of his very favorite
weekend activities.
This disorder is characterized by loss of pleasure; it involves
feeling a substantially diminished interest in most activities,
including activities found enjoyable in the past.
4. Repetitive, compulsive
behaviors
Sarah locks each of her windows three times whenever she
leaves her house in order to prevent a burglary, she uses a
new bar of soap every time she washes her hands, and she
runs a virus scan on her computer every hour, even when
her computer is disconnected from the Internet.
This disorder is characterized by repetitive behaviors; it
involves feeling compelled to repeatedly engage in
behaviors aimed at preventing some dreaded event,
even though these behaviors are not a realistic means
for preventing what they are intended to prevent.
5. Feelings of worthlessness/
guilt
Chris believes that he is incompetent at his job, despite
excellent performance evaluations, and blames himself for
his company’s recent financial losses that were actually
caused by uncontrollable circumstances; when a busy co-
worker passes by him without engaging in a lengthy con-
versation, he thinks it is because he is inherently unlikeable.
This disorder is characterized by feelings of
worthlessness, with unrealistically negative self-
evaluations; it involves an exaggerated sense of guilt and
personal responsibility for negative occurrences and
interpreting neutral, day-to-day events as evidence of
personal defects, even though these occurrences are not
realistic reflections of poor character.
6. Recurrent nightmares Mike has nightmares almost every night; he often dreams
that he is a passenger on an airplane that is out of control
and about to crash, or that he has been kidnapped by a
serial killer who is planning to torture him.
This disorder is characterized by frequent nightmares; it
involves having terrifying dreams more nights than not,
which often portray threats to physical safety and may
involve life-threatening situations.
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questions. Five participants who did not show this pattern
for the two filler items (i.e. giving responses at least two
standard deviations below the mean on the biological ques-
tions [the average of Q1–3 below] or two standard devia-
tions above the mean on one of the sets of psychological
questions [the average of Q4–6 or Q7–9 below]) were ex-
cluded from the final data analyses.
For the main experiment, nine questions were devel-
oped to measure people’s judgments of the biological
and psychological bases of behaviors. Three biological
questions were designed to probe beliefs about biological
causes of behaviors:
Q1. Do you think [their/her/his] brain chemistry is
different from that of people who [are not like this/do
not do this]?
Q2. Do you think [their/her/his] brain structures are
different from those of people who [are not like this/do
not do this]?
Q3. Do you think there is a genetic basis for this?
Because naïve biology is likely to be limited, only three
questions could be developed (e.g. additional questionsregarding neuromodulators, etc., would not be meaningful
if laypeople did not have a strong intuitive understanding
of them). In contrast, because the existing literature sug-
gests that naïve psychology encompasses a number of as-
pects of behavior (e.g. Malle & Knobe, 1997; Waytz, Gray,
Epley, & Wegner, 2010), limiting the possible psycho-
logical questions to three to match the number of bio-
logical questions would unnecessarily restrict the scope of
the findings. Six questions were therefore gathered to
probe beliefs in psychological causes of behaviors:
Q4. Do you think this is caused by cognitive factors
(e.g. [their/her/his] beliefs, knowledge, intelligence, or
thinking style)?
Q5. Do you think this is caused by [their/her/his]
emotions and desires?
Q6. Do you think this is caused by [their/her/his]
[personalities/personality]?
Q7. Do you think [they are/she is/he is] intentionally
[like this/doing this]?
Q8. Do you think [they/she/he] should be [held
responsible for/given credit for] [being like this/doing this]?
Q9. Do you think the causes of this are under [their/
her/his] control?
Fig. 1 Results of Experiment 1. a Judgments of the biological and
psychological bases of disordered behaviors rated within-subject; bars
depict Cousineau–Morey standard errors (Cousineau, 2005; Morey,
2008). b The 95% confidence intervals of the difference scores
(concrete minus abstract) for ratings on the nine dependent measures.
“Biological Causes” in (a) are the averaged ratings of the first three
dependent measures listed in (b), and “Psychological (Sets 1 & 2)
Causes” are the averaged ratings of the last six dependent measures
listed in (b)
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from tables of contents of Introductory Psychology text-
books as factors that are frequently addressed in the
study of individual differences. Q7, Q8, and Q9 (Psycho-
logical Set 2) were derived from questions measuring be-
liefs about agency (e.g. Weiner, 1995, 2001).
Participants responded to these questions on scales of
1–7 (where 1 = not at all; 7 = definitely). For each version
of each behavior, the nine questions were presented in
randomized order across participants and across items.
For each item, participants completed the nine explan-
ation judgments on the same screen, with each item pre-
sented on a separate screen.
Procedure and design
All experiments were programmed using the online survey
software Qualtrics (Qualtrics Labs, Inc., 2005). After read-
ing a general overview of the task, each participant com-
pleted two blocks of items. Each block began with a filler
item, followed by the six disorders listed in Table 1, with
half of the disorders in the abstract version and half in the
concrete version, presented in a random order. The second
block contained the abstract versions of the concrete items
from the first block, and the concrete versions of the ab-
stract items from the first block. That is, participants rated
both the abstract and concrete versions of each item, with
the two versions in separate halves of the experiment in a
counterbalanced order. From the participants’ perspective,
there was no obvious marking for filler items or switching
between blocks. Upon completing all items, participants
completed a dualism scale (Stanovich, 1989).
To summarize, the experiment incorporated a 2
(abstract or concrete) × 2 (psychological attributions
or biological attributions) within-subjects design.
Results
We first computed a biological score for each item by
averaging each participant’s responses to the three bio-
logical measures (Cronbach’s α = 0.97, calculated by item),
and a psychological score for each item by averaging each
participant’s responses to the six psychological measures
(α = 0.97).
We predicted that biological attributions would be
greater for the abstract version than for the concrete ver-
sion and that psychological attributions would be greater
for the concrete version than for the abstract version. To
test this, we conducted a 2 (concrete or abstract) × 2 (bio-
logical or psychological) repeated measures ANOVA on
each participant’s mean across items. This analysis revealed
the predicted interaction, F(1,42) = 95.68, p < 0.001, ηp
2 =
0.70, as shown in Fig. 1a. Biological attributions were higher
for the abstract versions (M = 5.37, SD = 1.23) than for the
concrete versions (M = 4.65, SD = 1.16), t(42) = −6.32, p <
0.001, d = −0.96, while psychological attributions werehigher for the concrete versions (M = 4.80, SD = 0.89) than
for the abstract versions (M = 3.70, SD = 0.99), t(38) = 10.85,
p < 0.001, d = 1.65.
Figure 1b shows the 95% confidence intervals of the
difference scores (concrete minus abstract) for each of
the nine component measures. Each measure yielded a
difference score that was significantly negative for all
three biological measures, indicating a stronger prefer-
ence for biological explanations in the abstract, and sig-
nificantly positive for all six psychological measures,
indicating a stronger preference for psychological expla-
nations in the concrete.
The interaction effect also held up in a by-item analysis,
using each item’s mean score across participants. A 2 (ab-
stract or concrete) × 2 (biological or psychological) repeated
measures ANOVA on these scores revealed a significant
interaction, F(1,5) = 17.32, p = 0.009, ηp
2 = 0.78. Biological at-
tributions were higher for the abstract versions (M = 5.37,
SD = 0.30) than for the concrete versions (M = 4.65, SD =
0.89), t(5) = −2.58, p = 0.049, d = −1.05, while psychological
Fig. 2 Results of Experiment 2. a Judgments of the biological and
psychological bases of disordered behaviors rated between-subject; bars
depict Cousineau–Morey standard errors (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
b The 95% confidence intervals of the difference scores (concrete minus
abstract) for ratings on the nine dependent measures. “Biological Causes”
in (a) are the averaged ratings of the first three dependent mea-
sures listed in (b), “Psychological Set 1 Causes” the second three,
and “Psychological Set 2 Causes” the last three
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4.80, SD = 0.95) than for the abstract versions (M = 3.70,
SD = 0.44), t(5) = 5.04, p = 0.004, d = 2.06.
Discussion
Experiment 1 found that biological attributions were
higher for abstract than concrete descriptions and psy-
chological attributions were higher for concrete than ab-
stract descriptions for the same behaviors. Remarkably,
although neither the abstract nor the concrete version
explicitly mentioned anything about the causes of the
behaviors, attributions were strongly affected by the
framing manipulation. Thus, not only expert clinicians
(Kim et al., 2016), but also laypeople, show an effect of
framing on their causal attributions for behavior. Further-
more, the effect occurred robustly across all measures we
used of psychological and biological attributions, suggest-
ing that it is quite broad.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, each participant made both biological
and psychological attributions. This design enabled us to
demonstrate shifts within the same individual, but it is
possible that participants may have felt experimenter de-
mand to rate the biological and psychological questions
in opposing directions. Experiment 2 therefore aimed to
replicate the finding using a between-subjects design;
that is, by having participants make only biological or
only psychological judgments.
Method
A total of 124 participants were recruited via Amazon
Mechanical Turk, of whom nine were excluded (N = 2
due to taking similar studies in the past and N = 7 due
to random responses on filler items).
The stimulus materials were the same as in Experiment
1. Unlike in Experiment 1, the nine questions were
grouped into three sets: Biological (Q1, Q2, and Q3 as de-
scribed in Experiment 1), Psychological Set 1 (Q4, Q5,
and Q6), and Psychological Set 2 (Q7, Q8, and Q9). Each
participant received only one of the three groups of ques-
tions (N = 41 for Biological, N = 38 for Psychological Set 1,
N = 36 for Psychological Set 2). The six psychological
questions were split into two groups to equate the total
number of questions received across all participants. Sam-
ple sizes were determined by power analyses on the data
from Experiment 1, with 95% power subject to a mini-
mum of 40 participants per condition (prior to excluding
random responders and repeat participants).
Results and discussion
We conducted a 2 × 3 mixed-model ANOVA on each par-
ticipant’s mean across items, with framing (concrete or ab-
stract) as a within-subjects factor and attribution type(Biological, Psychological Set 1, or Psychological Set 2) as
a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed the pre-
dicted interaction, F(2,112) = 54.83, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.50, as
shown in Fig. 2a. Biological attributions were higher for
the abstract (M = 5.31, SD = 1.20) than for the con-
crete versions (M = 4.67, SD = 1.25), t(40) = −7.47, p <
0.001, d = −1.67. Conversely, psychological attributions
were higher for the concrete than for the abstract ver-
sions, both for Psychological Set 1 (M = 5.08, SD = 1.51
vs. M = 4.55, SD = 1.96), t(37) = 3.44, p = 0.001, d = 0.56,
and for Psychological Set 2 (M = 3.83, SD = 1.21 vs. M
= 2.52, SD = 1.17), t(35) = 8.36, p < 0.001, d = 1.38. As
shown in Fig. 2b, the difference scores (concrete minus
abstract) were significant in the predicted direction for
eight of the nine measures (p < 0.05, two-tailed; cogni-
tive factors reached marginal significance in the pre-
dicted direction, p < 0.10).
The interaction effect also held up in a by-item analysis.
A 2 (abstract or concrete) × 2 (psychological or biological)
repeated measures ANOVA on the item means revealed a
significant interaction, F(1,5) = 22.51, p = 0.005, ηp
2 = 0.15.
Fig. 3 Mean judgments of medication and psychotherapy treatment
efficacy in Experiment 3. Bars depict Cousineau–Morey standard
errors (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008)
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sions (M = 5.31, SD = 0.26) than for the concrete versions
(M = 4.67, SD = 0.64), t(5) = −3.04, p = 0.029, d = −1.24,
while psychological attributions were significantly higher
for the concrete versions (M = 4.45, SD = 0.84) than for
the abstract versions (M = 3.54, SD = 0.28), t(5) = 3.90, p =
0.011, d = 1.59.
These results show that the strong shifts in attribution
shown in Experiment 1 cannot have occurred due to de-
mand to inversely rate biological and psychological causes.
Rather, these shifts occur independently, reflecting both a
stronger belief in biological causation in the abstract and a
stronger belief in psychological causation in the concrete.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we tested whether the effect of abstract
versus concrete framing on biological versus psycho-
logical attributions might have a downstream effect on
the perceived efficacy of treatments for mental disorders.
Such a finding would have implications both for psychi-
atric intervention and for public health, since perceived
treatment efficacy can influence actual treatment efficacy
(Meyer et al., 2002).
People believe that medication is more effective for
disorders that they perceive to be biologically based and
that psychotherapy is more effective for those they per-
ceive as psychologically based (e.g. Iselin & Addis, 2003;
Luk & Bond, 1992; Yopchick & Kim, 2009). We there-
fore predicted that medication would be seen as more
effective in treating symptoms described abstractly ra-
ther than concretely, since abstract descriptions were
more compatible with biological explanations (Experi-
ments 1 and 2). Put differently, making an effect (e.g. a
mental disorder) appear to be more biologically caused
(e.g. by neurotransmitter imbalances) should make bio-
logical interventions on that causal system (e.g. medica-
tion) appear more effective. In contrast, since concrete
framing makes psychological explanations more avail-
able, psychological interventions (e.g. psychotherapy)
should appear more effective with concrete rather than
abstract framing.
Method
We recruited 40 participants from Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Participants made judgments about the abstract and
concrete versions of the same items used in Experiments
1 and 2. However, rather than judging explanations, they
rated the extent to which they believed psychotherapy
would be an effective treatment and the extent to which
they believed medication would be an effective treatment,
on separate scales from 1 (“not at all”) to 9 (“completely”).
Participants were told that psychotherapy refers to “treat-
ment by psychological means, involving repeated verbal
interactions between a clinician and a client,” and thatmedication refers to “treatment by psychiatric, psy-
choactive, or psychotropic drugs.” These judgments were
always made on the same page and their order was coun-
terbalanced so that some participants always made medi-
cation judgments first and other participants always made
psychotherapy judgments first. The abstract versus con-
crete framing was a within-subject factor with the order of
the items counterbalanced as in Experiment 1, so that the
abstract and concrete versions of the same item would ap-
pear in separate halves of the experiment.Results and discussion
We conducted a 2 (concrete or abstract) × 2 (medication
or psychotherapy) repeated-measures ANOVA on indi-
vidual participants’ means across items. This analysis re-
vealed the predicted interaction, F(1,39) = 9.61, p = 0.004,
ηp
2 = 0.20, as shown in Fig. 3. Medication was judged
more effective when the disorder was framed abstractly
(M = 5.71; SD = 1.64) rather than concretely (M = 5.22;
SD = 1.60), t(39) = 3.70; p = 0.001; d = 0.58. However,
judgments of the effectiveness of psychotherapy did not
reliably differ between the abstract (M = 6.57; SD = 1.18)
and concrete versions (M = 6.66; SD = 1.13), t(39) = 0.79,
p = 0.43, d = 0.13.
When behaviors are described more abstractly, and
biological explanations thereby seem more plausible
(as shown in Experiments 1 and 2), the current results
suggest that people come to believe that biological inter-
ventions on that causal system are more likely to influence
those behaviors. These results generalize the effect of ab-
stract and concrete framing on biological attributions to a
new measure. That said, it is difficult to say whether or
not the effect on treatment decisions is statistically medi-
ated by attributions, since the effect was found for medi-
cation but not for psychotherapy. A test for mediation
would require a design that measured both attributions
and treatments simultaneously.
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cacy judgments? Although it is possible that this oc-
curred because the effect of abstract/concrete framing
on psychological explanations is less stable than the ef-
fect on biological explanations, we think this is not the
most likely explanation. The abstractness manipulation
was sufficient to find robust differences for both psycho-
logical and biological explanations in Experiments 1 and
2 and this same manipulation was used here in Experi-
ment 3. Instead, the null effect on psychotherapy judg-
ments is likely the result of a ceiling effect: Participants’
judgments for the psychotherapy items were between 6.5
and 7 on a nine-point scale, which may be at ceiling
given people’s moderate perceptions of the degree to
which psychotherapy has the potential to be effective
(Jorm, 2012; Ten Have et al., 2010). In contrast, people
know much less about psychotropic medications (Jorm,
2012); thus, for medication judgments they may rely
more on their perceptions of the biological basis of the
items, as shifted by the framing effect demonstrated in
Experiment 3.
Experiment 4
Experiments 1–3 showed that biological and psycho-
logical attributions shift depending on abstract versus
concrete framing not only for clinicians (as shown in
Kim et al., 2016), but for laypeople as well, and across a
wide range of specific psychological and biological
causes. However, these experiments leave unanswered
the question of whether these attribution shifts would
also occur across a wider range of human behaviors.
Mental disorders may be something of a special case, be-
cause both clinicians and laypeople are accustomed to
hearing both psychological and biological levels of ex-
planation for disordered behaviors. Experiments 4 and 5
tested whether such shifts would also occur for behav-
iors which are more closely within the range of familiar
human experience, but which are somewhat out of the
ordinary and hence seem in need of an explanation.
Method
Participants
Forty-nine lay participants were recruited via Amazon
Mechanical Turk, of whom ten were excluded (N = 2
due to taking similar studies in the past and N = 8 due
to random responses on filler items).
Materials and pretest
We picked eight everyday behaviors, including both
positively and negatively valenced behaviors. All of these
behaviors were realistic and required some explanation
(e.g. having difficulty focusing on tasks for a long time;
staying calm during a competitive situation; see Table 2
for a list of all stimuli). To show that the effect ariseswhen people are thinking about everyday behaviors,
we avoided highly rare behaviors, such as behaviors
that were extremely positive (e.g. memorizing 100-digit
matrices on a single viewing) or extremely negative (e.g.
committing serial murder). In addition, to circumvent
ceiling or floor effects, we avoided using behaviors for the
main test items that would likely be perceived as very
strongly biologically caused (e.g. breathing).
For each behavior, we developed an abstract version by
describing the behavior as being common to a group of
people. Each abstract version started with “Some people…”
and described the behavior as generally applied to them
without presenting any idiosyncratic variations. For the cor-
responding concrete version, we specified a person with a
first name and instantiated the behaviors in the context of
that particular person using concrete terms. The two ver-
sions were roughly equated for length (see Table 1).
As for Experiment 1, we conducted a pretest of these
items to determine whether the abstract and concrete
versions of each behavior were perceived to correspond
to each other as intended. We recruited a separate group
of 41 participants for this pretest, of whom five were ex-
cluded for failing the attention check. Of the remaining
36 pretest participants, 18 judged whether the abstract
version was “a good abstract description” of the concrete
version on a scale of 1–9 (where 1 = a very poor descrip-
tion; 9 = a very good description), yielding a mean rating
of 7.61 (SD = 0.26). A separate group of 18 participants
judged whether the concrete version was “a good ex-
ample” of the abstract version on a scale of 1–9 (where
1 = a very poor example; 9 = a very good example), yield-
ing a mean rating of 7.99 (SD = 0.23). Mean ratings by
behavior were all at least 7.33.
Procedure
The main experiment used the same measures as Exper-
iments 1 and 2. The procedure was the same as Experi-
ment 1, except that each participant made judgments for
only half of the items in Table 2, in order to keep the
length of the experiment reasonable. As in Experiment
1, the items were counterbalanced so that the abstract
and concrete versions of the same item appeared in sep-
arate halves of the experiment.
Results
Each participant’s biological (α = 0.95, calculated by item)
and psychological (α = 0.85) attributions were averaged
separately. We conducted a 2 (concrete or abstract) × 2
(biological or psychological) repeated measures ANOVA
on each participant’s mean across items. This analysis re-
vealed the predicted interaction, F(1,38) = 33.95, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.47, as shown in Fig. 4a. Biological attributions
were higher for the abstract versions (M = 4.81, SD =
1.22) than for the concrete versions (M = 4.42, SD =
Table 2 Stimuli for Experiments 4 and 5
Behavior Text version
Concrete Abstract
1. Having extra-
marital affairs
Douglas has been regularly sleeping with his ex-girlfriend at a
local hotel; he has created an elaborate lie to tell his wife,
claiming that he has to spend evenings and weekends away
from the house doing extra work for his unreasonable boss.
Some men have extra-marital affairs; they have an ongoing
sexual relationship with someone other than their spouse,
typically without their spouse’s knowledge, and they fre-
quently engage in deceptive behaviors to cover up these
actions.
2. Having a great
memory for names
Denise memorized the names of all of the students in her 85-
person lecture course within the first couple of class meetings
and she spent only a little extra time outside of class review-
ing their names and photographs.
Some people have a great memory for names; they can learn
to match a large number of names to faces under conditions
of limited time, all without seeming to undergo an
extraordinary amount of mental effort.
3. Being nervous in
social settings
Cheryl gets nervous at all of the company dinners and parties
she is expected to attend with her colleagues; she worries
about whether she sounds intelligent and whether her dress,
hair, and makeup look right.
Some people are nervous in social settings; when they are
placed in any situation in which they are expected to mingle
with other people, including people they already know, they
get worried and anxious.
4. Staying calm
during a competitive
situation
Allen stays calm during his figure skating performance in
international competition; he lands all of his difficult jumps
perfectly while under tremendous pressure to do well on
behalf of his country.
Some people stay calm during a competitive situation; they
are able to perform well despite being under a considerable
amount of pressure to live up to the expectations of others
and themselves.
5. Having difficulty
focusing on tasks for
a long time
Raymond has difficulty focusing on writing the sales
presentations required by his job; he repeatedly stops
working to chat with co-workers, shop online, and watch viral
YouTube videos.
Some people have difficulty focusing on tasks for a long time;
their attention wanders and they engage in alternative
activities that do not advance their work on the task at hand.
6. Drinking too much Martin frequently drinks too many tequila shots; he knows
that his system can really only handle one per hour, but
always drinks at least three times that amount, vomits, and
then has terrible hangovers the next day.
Some people drink too much; they knowingly ingest more
alcohol than their digestive systems can adequately process
in a short span of time, and do so more frequently than is
advisable for maximum wellbeing.
7. Tending to be
optimistic about the
future
Sharon tends to be optimistic about her career trajectory; she
anticipates that her own performance will be excellent and
expects to get good job assignments and eventual
promotions.
Some people tend to be optimistic about the future; they
approach the world with positive expectations about what
events will happen in the future and how those events will
unfold.
8. Being very driven
to achieve
Thomas is very intent on becoming a top executive at his
corporation; he works 18-h days and has never missed a work
meeting, although he has missed many of his children’s
sports games and recitals.
Some people tend to be very driven to achieve; this involves
putting the vast majority of their time, effort, and mental
focus on achieving their goals and paying relatively less
attention to other areas of life.
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chological attributions were higher for the concrete ver-
sions (M = 6.04, SD = 0.84) than for the abstract versions
(M = 5.65, SD = 0.93), t(38) = 4.84, p < 0.001, d = 0.78.
As shown in Fig. 4b, the effects for each component
measure were directionally consistent with our predictions
and with previous experiments, but were somewhat more
variable. Although six of the nine measures reached signifi-
cance at the p < 0.05 level (two-tailed t-test against 0), one
biological factor reached marginal significance (brain struc-
ture; p < 0.10), and two psychological factors did not signifi-
cantly differ from 0 (cognitive factors and personality; see
below for discussion).
The interaction effect also held up in a by-item ana-
lysis, using each item’s mean score across participants.
A 2 (abstract or concrete) × 2 (biological or psycho-
logical) repeated measures ANOVA on these scores re-
vealed the predicted interaction, F(1,7) = 16.62, p =
0.005, ηp
2 = 0.70. Biological attributions were higher for
the abstract versions (M = 4.81, SD = 0.83) than for the
concrete versions (M = 4.42, SD = 0.83), t(7) = −4.27, p= 0.004, d = −1.51, while psychological attributions were
higher for the concrete versions (M = 6.04, SD = 0.58)
than for the abstract versions (M = 5.65, SD = 0.90), t(7)
= 2.65, p = 0.033, d = 0.94.
Discussion
Experiment 4 found that shifts in attribution occur not only
for mental disorders, but for a much broader range of hu-
man behaviors. These shifts were consistent across the
three biological measures (albeit marginally significantly for
brain structures), but somewhat more variable across the
psychological measures. Although four of our psychological
measures shifted significantly in the predicted direction,
two others—cognitive factors and personality—did not.
Since all psychological measures shifted significantly in
Experiments 1 and 2 depending on framing, it is worth
considering why shifts were not seen for cognitive fac-
tors and personality in Experiment 4. We speculate that
these somewhat less consistent effects of psychological
attributions may be due in part to a weaker manipula-
tion of abstractness that we used in Experiment 4,
Fig. 4 Results of Experiment 4. a Judgments of the biological and
psychological bases of everyday behaviors rated within-subject; bars
depict Cousineau–Morey standard errors (Cousineau, 2005; Morey,
2008). b The 95% confidence intervals of the difference scores
(concrete minus abstract) for ratings on the nine dependent mea-
sures. “Biological Causes” in (a) are the averaged ratings of the first three
dependent measures listed in (b), and “Psychological (Sets 1 & 2) Causes”
are the averaged ratings of the last six dependent measures listed in (b)
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experiments described the behaviors at the level of a cat-
egory (a mental disorder) that did not invoke any indi-
viduals, Experiment 4 described the behaviors in terms
of a group of individuals engaging in the behavior. Because
even the abstract versions referred to human agents, they
might have somewhat triggered psychological explana-
tions. Furthermore, people may consider cognitive factors
(e.g. beliefs and intelligence) and personality to be more
immutable than the other, more transient psychological
factors we tested, such as emotions and intentions. None-
theless, significant shifts were still obtained for a majority
of our measures of psychological attribution—and all mea-
sures of biological attribution (at least marginally signifi-
cantly)—testifying to the robustness of the attributional
shifts in the face of this weaker manipulation.
Experiment 5
Experiment 5 sought to replicate the framing effects on
attributions for ordinary behaviors, using a between-
subjects design as in Experiment 2.Method
Two hundred and forty participants were recruited via
Amazon Mechanical Turk, of whom 21 were excluded
(N = 9 due to taking similar studies in the past and N =
12 due to random responses on filler items). Thus, data
from 219 participants were used for the analyses.
The stimulus materials were the same as in Experi-
ment 4. The design and the procedure were the same as
in Experiment 2 in that participants received either the
Biological (N = 36), the Psychological Set 1 (N = 145), or
the Psychological Set 2 (N = 38) questions. Sample sizes
were determined by power analyses on the data from Ex-
periment 4, with 95% power subject to a minimum of 40
participants per condition (prior to excluding random
responders and repeat participants).
Results and discussion
We conducted a 2 × 3 mixed-model ANOVA on each
participant’s mean across items, with framing (concrete
or abstract) as a within-subjects factor and attribution
(Biological, Psychological Set 1, or Psychological Set 2)
as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed the
predicted interaction, F(1,228) = 51.15, p < 0.001, ηp
2 =
0.31, as shown in Fig. 5a. Biological attributions were
higher for the abstract (M = 5.29, SD = 1.11) than for the
concrete versions (M = 4.57, SD = 1.34), t(35) = −6.81, p <
0.001, d = −1.13, whereas the responses to the Psycho-
logical Set 2 questions were higher for the concrete (M =
6.71, SD = 0.74) than for the abstract versions (M = 6.24,
SD = 0.95), t(37) = 5.16, p < 0.001, d = 0.84. The responses
to the Psychological Set 1 questions did not differ between
the concrete and abstract versions (M = 6.27, SD = 0.85 vs.
M = 6.22, SD = 0.85), t(144) = 1.18, p = 0.24, d = 0.10,
because cognitive abilities and personality—the two
psychological measures that did not reach significance in
Experiment 1—were unaffected by the manipulation. (See
Fig. 5b for the 95% confidence intervals of the difference
scores for each measure.) Again, we suspect that these less
consistent effects on psychological attributions may be at-
tributable to the weaker manipulation of abstractness used
in Experiments 4 and 5, compared to Experiments 1–3,
perhaps in conjunction with a tendency to view cognitive
and personality factors as more immutable than the other
psychological factors. Importantly, however, the effects on
psychological attributions were significant overall and
consistent for four of the six measures.
The interaction effect also held up in a by-item ana-
lysis. A 2 (abstract or concrete) × 2 (biological or psycho-
logical) repeated measures ANOVA on the item means
revealed a significant interaction, F(1,7) = 38.80, p <
0.001, ηp
2 = 0.85. Biological attributions were higher for
the abstract versions (M = 5.26, SD = 0.69) than for the
concrete versions (M = 4.54, SD = 0.87), t(7) = −5.33, p =
0.001, d = −1.88, while psychological attributions were
Fig. 5 Results of Experiment 5. a Judgments of the biological and
psychological bases of everyday behaviors rated between-subjects;
bars depict Cousineau–Morey standard errors (Cousineau, 2005;
Morey, 2008). b The 95% confidence intervals of the difference
scores (concrete minus abstract) for ratings on the nine dependent
measures. “Biological Causes” in (a) are the averaged ratings of the first
three dependent measures listed in (b), “Psychological Set 1 Causes”
the second three, and “Psychological Set 2 Causes” the last three
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SD = 0.45) than for the abstract versions (M = 6.25, SD =
0.71), t(7) = 2.15, p = 0.069, d = 0.76. Follow-up analyses
conducted separately on the two sets of psychological
measures showed that this marginally significant effect on
psychological attributions occurred because concrete
items were rated significantly higher than abstract items
on the Psychological Set 2 measures (M = 6.74, SD = 0.91
vs. M = 6.28, SD = 1.15), t(7) = 2.49, p = 0.041, d = 0.88,
while the concrete and abstract items were rated similarly
on the Psychological Set 1 measures (M = 6.27, SD = 0.33
vs. M = 6.22, SD = 0.45), t(7) = 0.59, p = 0.57, d = 0.21.
In sum, the results of Experiment 5 fully replicate the
findings of Experiment 4, where biological attributions
were consistently stronger in the abstract and psycho-
logical attributions were typically stronger in the con-
crete (with two of six measures failing to reach
significance). Finding these same effects in a between-
subjects design shows that the framing shifts cannot be
due to a perceived demand to rate the psychological and
biological explanations inversely.
General discussion
In daily life, people often describe behaviors at differing
levels of abstraction—as abstract generalizations acrossindividuals or as concrete behaviors of individuals. We
hypothesized that this distinction between abstract and
concrete framing would lead to different explanatory
preferences; namely, a stronger preference for biological
explanations in the abstract and more reluctance to
accept biological explanations for concrete cases.
The results across Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5 corrobo-
rated this hypothesis. Both in contemplating disordered
(Experiments 1 and 2) and everyday behaviors (Experi-
ments 4 and 5), participants generally judged explana-
tions in terms of genetics, neural chemistry, and brain
structure to be more appropriate when faced with ab-
stract descriptions of behavior than when faced with
concrete cases. These differing explanatory stances also
had downstream consequences such that people pre-
ferred a more “biological” intervention (medication) for
treating disorders when described abstractly than when
described in terms of a concrete case (Experiment 3).
It should also be noted that our claims are only about
whether endorsement of biological and psychological ex-
planations was influenced by abstract descriptions rela-
tive to concrete descriptions. Thus, we are not claiming
that abstract framing would increase endorsement of
biological explanations to the extent that they would be
preferred to psychological explanations. In fact, this was
not the case in Experiments 3–5. Similarly, we are not
claiming that concrete framing would make psycho-
logical explanations be endorsed more than biological
explanations; again, the current results failed to show
that consistently (Experiments 1 and 2). Preferences for
biological versus psychological explanations can vary
greatly simply due to the nature of the events. For in-
stance, “Don is full of himself” would be difficult to ex-
plain in terms of biological factors and thus although an
abstract framing like “Some people are full of them-
selves” may make biological accounts more plausible,
psychological accounts may still be more dominant than
biological accounts even in the abstract framing.
In addition, we acknowledge that other factors may in-
fluence the availability of biological versus psychological
explanations, including individual differences in theory
of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1997), cognitive reflectiveness
(Frederick, 2005), or even a desire to blame others for
their behavior (Clark et al., 2014). We do not mean to
downplay the importance of other potential factors, but
rather seek to argue that the abstract/concrete distinc-
tion plays a key role.
Possible mechanisms
In the introduction, we briefly presented two explanations
for this framing effect. First, abstract framing, which con-
veys general patterns, triggers the need for more immut-
able explanations (e.g. Cimpian & Salomon, 2014), and
biological properties are judged to be immutable and
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2013) just like generic abstract framing. Second, previous
studies found that people more strongly attribute behav-
iors to free will when the events are described in more
concrete contexts (e.g. Nichols & Knobe, 2007). We ac-
knowledge that there are also other possible mechanisms
for this framing effect and we briefly discuss three here: an
inverse relationship between psychological and biological
judgments, dualist thinking, and the influence of formal
education.
Inverse relationship between psychological and biological
judgments
People have been shown to behave as though biological
and psychological explanations have an inverse relation-
ship. That is, people sometimes behave as though factors
making one kind of explanation more plausible corres-
pondingly make the other kind less plausible (e.g. Preston,
Ritter, & Hepler, 2013; see also Ahn, Proctor, & Flanagan,
2009 for similar findings with clinicians). Thus, salient
psychological explanations for concrete cases may add-
itionally suppress biological explanations and salient
biological explanations for abstract cases may also add-
itionally suppress psychological explanations. In that
sense, this belief in an inverse relationship is not by itself
an explanation for our effects because there should be
an initial mechanism for making biological explanations
salient for abstract cases or psychological explanations
salient for concrete cases. Yet, once biological explanations
become salient for abstract framing (due to, for instance,
biological explanations being compatible with generic
abstract framing), it may make psychological explana-
tions less salient for abstract framing.
Dualist thinking
Recent work has explored the possibility that people are
intuitive mind–body dualists, who believe that the mind
and brain are separate entities (e.g. Bloom, 2007; For-
stmann, Burgmer, & Mussweiler, 2012; Hood, Gjersoe, &
Bloom, 2012; Hook & Farah, 2013). Whereas philoso-
phers of mind hold that biology and psychology repre-
sent separable levels of analysis, such explanations are
usually seen as complementary (e.g. Dennett, 1971). Lay-
people may instead see these explanations as competing
(e.g. Preston et al., 2013)—a form of dualism that is not
inconsistent with the current findings.
The current results could also help to explain previous
framing effects in judgments of free will. Nichols and
Knobe (2007) found that people often endorse determin-
ism in the abstract, but are more inclined toward belief in
free will for individuals (Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Our re-
sults suggest one possible explanation for this result—that
people are dualists in the sense that they do not juxtapose
biological and psychological explanations, but rather treatthem as competing explanations, privileging one over the
other depending on the context. Our findings suggest that
people may be subtly drawn to physicalism, the claim that
everything is physical or is necessitated by the physical,
more strongly in the abstract than in the concrete.
That said, our results do not present any direct dem-
onstrations of Cartesian dualism, the claim that mind
and body are distinct substances. We collected partici-
pants’ dualists beliefs at the end of Experiments 1 and 4,
presenting them with the dualism scale from Stanovich
(1989), and found that the framing effects did not correl-
ate with people’s dualist beliefs. In this scale, participants
judged their agreement with 27 statements (e.g. “the
mind and the brain are two totally separate things;” “in a
hundred years or more, it might make sense to refer to a
computer as having a mind”) on a 5-point scale. For
each participant, we computed the correlation between
their scores on this dualism scale and the extent to
which they showed the framing effect. As an index of
framing effects, we added each participant’s difference
score (i.e. concrete minus abstract) for psychological at-
tributions to the opposite sign difference score (i.e. ab-
stract minus concrete) for biological attributions. This
provides an estimate of the interactive effect of concrete-
ness/abstractness on psychological and biological attri-
butions for each participant. The average correlation
between the dualism scale and the framing effect was
significantly negative in Experiment 1, r(41) = −0.38, p =
0.013, and failed to reach significance in Experiment 3,
r(37) = 0.34, p = 0.16. Taken together, these findings speak
against the possibility that those who are more likely to
endorse mind–body dualism are more likely to be subject
to the abstract/concrete framing effect. Nonetheless, these
null results should be taken with caution, in part because
the dualism scale may have become a less valid measure
of dualist beliefs in recent years. That is, the pervasiveness
of biological accounts of human behaviors may have made
laypeople deny mind–body dualism when confronted ex-
plicitly, as is the case in the dualism scale. Future research,
using more implicit measures of dualism, can help us bet-
ter understand the shape and the scope of dualist beliefs
that laypeople hold.
Context-sensitivity of intuitive and formal theories
People hold lay theories across many domains that differ
dramatically from more formal scientific theories, in-
cluding theories in biology (Shtulman, 2006), physics
(McCloskey, 1983), statistics (Tversky & Kahneman,
1971), economics (Furnham & Argyle, 1998), personality
(Haslam et al., 2004), decision theory (Johnson & Rips,
2015), and emotion (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). Further,
these lay theories often coexist in an individual’s mind
with their formal counterparts (Shtulman & Valcarcel,
2012). Adults who have had many years of formal
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the appropriate scientific theory if asked explicitly none-
theless show slower response times in verifying facts that
have different truth values on their formal and intuitive
theories (e.g. “fire is composed of matter” or “air is com-
posed of matter”), compared to facts that have the same
truth values on both theories (e.g. “rocks are composed
of matter” or “numbers are composed of matter”). In-
deed, under time pressure, expert biologists fall back on
their intuitive theories of biology, according to which
plants are non-living (Goldberg & Thompson-Schill,
2009) and expert physical scientists endorse teleological
explanations for physical phenomena (e.g. “Trees pro-
duce oxygen so that animals can breathe”; Kelemen,
Rottman, & Seston, 2013).
Very little is known, however, about what circumstances
lead individuals to apply their formal versus intuitive the-
ories to a problem when these theories disagree. We
speculate that people may be more likely to rely on their
formal theories in the abstract and more likely to default
to their earlier, intuitive theories in the concrete. This idea
can provide a further mechanism for the current findings.
Whereas folk psychology is a natural and early-emerging
mode of explanation (e.g. Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Onishi
& Baillargeon, 2005), brain-based biological explanations
seem to emerge later (Johnson & Wellman, 1982). Further,
people usually learn about biological explanations in an
abstract format. For example, science-based websites for
the public that explain the biological underpinnings of be-
havioral disorders (e.g. from such authoritative bodies as
the CDC, NIH, and Mayo Clinic) invariably describe what
is known about each disorder in general, rather than
describing individual case studies. Student textbooks
explaining the biology of behaviors and commercials mar-
keting psychotropic medications often take the same ap-
proach. Consequently, formally acquired biological
explanations for behavior may seem relatively natural in
the abstract, but people may default to their lay theories
such as folk psychology in the concrete, accounting for
our framing effect.
One way to test the formal education hypothesis
would be to ask whether an analogous effect arises in
other domains. Would people apply different lay eco-
nomic theories in contemplating one individual country
versus countries in general? Would people apply differ-
ent lay theories of evolution in contemplating one par-
ticular species versus species in general? Would people
give different advice about how to maximize happiness if
the advice is applied to a particular person versus people
in general? To the extent that formal and intuitive theor-
ies may give different verdicts, these questions may be of
considerable practical importance.
A second way to test the hypothesis would be to con-
duct developmental studies. Presumably, young childrendo not have a formal education in biology or neurosci-
ence, so if the effect is indeed driven by formal educa-
tion, it should not arise among young children. By
contrast, if the effect is driven by an intuition that bio-
logical explanations are tied to immutability and hence
essentialism, it might arise much earlier in develop-
ment. For instance, Cimpian and Markman (2011)
found that when asked to explain either generic state-
ments (e.g. boys are good at math) or non-generic
statements (e.g. Johnny is good at math), even four-
year-olds preferred to explain generic statements in terms
of inherent features (e.g. “because that’s how they’re
made”) than extrinsic features (e.g. “because they got tea-
ched”). This effect of genericity on intuitions about inher-
ence does not seem to require formal education, and if
our framing effects are driven by the same process, they
might be similarly early-emerging. On the other hand, our
results are more nuanced in that people distinguished be-
tween biological explanations and psychological explana-
tions, when both (or at least some of the psychological
explanations used in the current study) are treated as in-
herent and essentialized explanations in the previous de-
velopmental studies. This finer distinction may emerge
later in development as a result of learning biological the-
ories in the abstract context.
Implications for Public Health and Science Education
We found that, like clinicians (Kim et al., 2016), laypeople
endorse different explanations for mental disorders in the
abstract and in the concrete (Experiments 1 and 2), which
can even lead to different treatment recommendations
(Experiment 3). These results have implications for public
communication about mental disorders. Biological expla-
nations of psychopathology lead people to essentialize
mental disorders (e.g. Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Haslam
& Ernst, 2002), to distance themselves from or reduce em-
pathy toward people who have mental disorders (Lebowitz
& Ahn, 2014; Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006), and
to be more pessimistic about mental disorder prognoses
(Deacon & Baird, 2009; Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener,
2013). At the same time, however, these explanations can
ameliorate stigma by reducing personal blame for mental
disorder symptoms (e.g. Deacon & Baird, 2009). These
studies, along with the current results, suggest that, de-
pending on the goal of communication, it may be best to
use either abstract or concrete descriptions. One should
use concrete descriptions if one wishes to de-essentialize
mental illness or improve perceived prognosis and ab-
stract descriptions if one wishes to reduce blame for the
symptoms.
Our finding also has implications for science education
more broadly. Science educators have long debated the
relative value of abstract and concrete teaching materials
(see Fyfe, McNeil, Son, & Goldstone, 2014 for a review).
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more likely to utilize real-world knowledge; Schliemann &
Carraher, 2002) and disadvantages (e.g. they can also dis-
tract with extraneous perceptual details; Belenky & Schalk,
2014); yet abstract materials, too, have their own benefits
(e.g. they emphasize structural features over superficial
features; Uttal, O’Doherty, Newland, Hand, & DeLoache,
2009) and pitfalls (e.g. mindless symbol manipulation;
Nathan, 2012). It is often noted that because of these com-
plementary advantages and disadvantages, the use of both
kinds of materials is necessary. However, our results sug-
gest another critical difference between these types of
materials—whereas the use of biological explanations (ac-
quired through science education) may be relatively nat-
ural in an abstract setting, students may fall back on their
psychological explanations in concrete settings. This high-
lights the need, not only to expose students to both kinds
of teaching materials, but to map the connections between
concrete problems and their abstract logical structure, if
educators hope for the biological explanations they are
teaching to their students to be generalized to the con-
crete world.
Conclusion
We explain human behaviors in multiple ways. We can
emphasize the importance of responsibility, controllability,
intentions, beliefs, and desires. We can also explain human
behavior in terms of biological forces, such as genes, neural
chemistry, and brain structure. Our results showed that
biological theories of behavior are more privileged when
contemplating abstract descriptions rather than concrete
cases. Thus, even though abstract and concrete descriptions
of behavior are both ubiquitous in the world, and often
seemingly equivalent, they can nonetheless lead to very dif-
ferent inferences about the causes underlying the behavior.
Endnote
1Although the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Associ-
ation, 2013) is the most recent version of the manual,
DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000)
was the only version available at the time we developed
these materials. Nevertheless, any statements made in
this paper in reference to the DSM-IV-TR are also valid
in terms of the DSM-5, as the particular symptoms we
used remain in the DSM-5.
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